Remember when Ms Clinton and Mr Lavrov pressed the "Overload" button back in 2009? And how it was supposed to labelled be the "Reset" button, but they mistranslated it?

Today NATO announced that the reformulated version of its European missile defence shield is partially up and running. Secretary-General Rasmussen says the system now possesses "interim operational capability". I can only assume he then assured everyone present at Chicago that "If Iran ever fires a Russian nuclear missile at East Europe from Novosibirsk, we'll be able to respond appropriately."

I'm being snarky, but that's pretty much the nature of the problem here. Washington's 2009 decision to scrap the original long-range missile placements in Poland and the Czech Republic may have attenuated the irritation, and New START was a great example of the sort of pragmatic, conservative Russia policy Mr Obama likes to be identified with. But there's still going to be lots of American hardware in Russia's traditional don't-touch zone in Central and Eastern Europe under the current NATO missile plan. The inevitable end result is that you have to deal with this sort of rhetoric from annoyed Russian military dignitaries. Yes, that's General Makarov attempting to pull a peculiar version of what -- if you'll pardon the indulgence -- could be called a "Kennedy stare-down" on the Atlantic allies.

He is not to be taken at face value. The bluster is what it is. But the disconnect between Russian and US/NATO rhetoric about the missile shield, and the extent of Russian consternation both reflect a genuine and nontrivial conflict of interest. On a global level, Moscow is worried that the ships, radars, and missile bases are there to neutralise Russian nuclear deterrent, and ultimately give NATO a theoretical first strike option. On a more immediate, regional level they are obviously dismayed that Russia's much-debated and strategically important "near abroad" is enthusiastically loading up on US weapons. No few CEE politicians and journalists have been reasonably explicit about the missile shield being, in their view, a deterrent against dormant or active Russian pressure, period. It's hard to imagine that Kremlin politicians like feeling impotent on their own front yard.

I want to clarify that I'm not advocating the wholesale acceptance of Russia's foreign policy position here, but you see how they might be a bit peeved, right? Now, how you navigate this on a NATO-RF level is one thing. Mr Obama and the relevant western governments can probably negotiate with Moscow on a rational basis. This does not have to be intractable; it's basically about balance of power. But these sorts of issues have a tendency to go global, and it occurs to me to ask what happens if Mr Obama were to find he really needs Mr Putin in the Iran nuclear talks? Any sort of real progress within the P5+1 is a very hard bought thing, and at least insofar Mr Obama embraces the forum as a serious tool, he may find that he needs to give Moscow some goodies in pursuit of the requisite level of group cohesion. I think Moscow pretty much insists on good, old-fashioned linkage on this. That is to say, they're looking forward to that flexibility Mr Obama promised he'd enjoy after the election.

So, you're in the White House. When does it become important to be able to say there's progress on Iran? Is P5+1 worth it, anyway? And how do you respond to a Russian insistence on linkage? I don't know the answer to that. It depends. But I hope Mr Obama's people have a list of options for him.

Mr Jean-Marc Ayrault is the new French prime minister, and Mr Laurent Fabius the new foreign minister. The finance portfolio has gone to former MEP and European affairs minister, Mr Pierre Moscovici. (Incidentally, he is also an erstwhile Strauss-Kahn ally.) What they'll mostly do for the next couple of weeks is prepare for elections. Former Socialist leader Ms Martine Aubry didn't get a ministerial job, which I think pretty much everyone has already commented on, but allies like Ms Marylise Lebranchu and Mr François Lamy did get portfolios.

Meanwhile, President Hollande is getting one of his first tastes of diplomatic discomfort. It isn't due to Franco-German disagreements, though. It's about Washington, and about Mr Hollande's promise to withdraw French troops from Afghanistan a year earler than Mr Sarkozy intended. The White House is obviously not thrilled about the idea.

Edit: Europe1 has a link to a nifty interactive guide to the government. Furthermore, someone's actually done a bit of maths based on it. Back during the Socialist primaries, various ministers supported various candidates. Unsurprisingly, the government is packed with Mr Hollande supporters. Their share of ministerial jobs is noticeably above Mr Hollande's showing in the primary. Meanwhile the proportion of the generally more left-leaning Aubryistes is somewhat below Ms Aubry's showing in the primary. (I notice that they also seem to have landed fairly junior posts, with the obvious exception of Mr Fabius. Even the relatively high-profile Ms Lebranchu didn't get back the justice portfolio she held way back during the Jospin government.)

Mr Tsipras explains his gamble for the Wall Street Journal. Based on this, his reasoning is that Greece's interlocutors will agree to a new deal because letting Greece go is an existential threat to the Economic and Monetary Union. Hence, Athens can afford to play chicken.

Greece announces new elections for 17th June. The Radical Left is probably going to win them. That will make it much more likely that a real coalition led by Mr Tsipras can assume power. There is a bit of a disconnect in the Radical Left rhetoric. On one hand we're consistently told by pollsters that Greeks want to stay in the euro; on the other hand, those same pollsters then tell us that repudiating austerity is their number one concern. And indeed, my understanding is that Mr Tsipras's party is, in fact, technically in favour of keeping the euro. Strange but true.

As a sincere position this would only make sense to me if Mr Tsipras and his people were outright prepared to gamble that Germany, its close cohorts like Austria, and indeed everyone else involved can be persuaded to start over, and renegotiate the deal in such a way that 1) everyone else's commitments remain substantially the same but 2) Greek commitments in terms of budget cuts, service liberalisation, &c. will become substantially lighter. I find it hard to believe Mr Tsipras believes that. Continental banks need less protection now than before. And Greece's interlocutors have already given quite a bit of ground. For Mr Tsipras to believe in that gamble he would almost have to believe that the EU and the IMF are willing to deal at any price.

Mr Barroso has today emphasised that the deal cannot be reopened. Others -- Mr Schäuble and Mr Rehn above all -- have said as much in the last few days. Mr Tsipras, on the other hand, is looking for a mandate explicitly based on a real opposition to the austerity programmes. So for all intents and purposes it seems that Greece is entering its financial endgame. Readoption of the drachma seems like the logical consequence. I assume Mr Tsipras will want to quickly impose capital controls when he takes over.

I just bet a small sum of money that Greece will go to new elections, rather than see Mr Tsipras or Mr Venizelos cobble together a government based on existing numbers. I've been wrong before, but I'm... let's say reasonably confident this will net me goodies. (Note to self: Watch out for PASOK! They still get a turn.)

Mr Alexis Tsipras emphasises that he won't yield to New Democracy and the Socialists on the EU/IMF deal. To get in government under Mr Tsipras, those parties would have to repudiate the current arrangement and possibly accept (overt) Greek bankruptcy. Unless something radically new happens, I'd say simple maths suggests new elections. That would likely give Mr Tsipras the number one position and the fifty bonus seats that come with it. It's not a complete guarantee that the parliamentary gridlock will dissolve, but it's a shot.

Les Echos reports Mr Hollande promising (fr) the name of his prime minister by May 15th. The paper speculates that the job will go to Mr Jean-Marc Ayrault, the mayor of Nantes. Reuters (among others) has suggested as much, albeit with reservations. Again, there won't be new elections until mid-June, so whoever gets promoted will spend a month or so essentially waiting for a Socialist majority to come into being.

In other news, scuttlebutt is Mr Laurent Fabius might get Quai d'Orsay. If true, that's an interesting move. Mr Fabius personified the Socialists' non faction during the party's TCE deliberations. Putting him in charge of the foreign ministry might conceivably raise a few eyebrows in eurocrat circles back in Brussels.

That was quick. Mr Antonis Samaras says he cannot put together a viable government coalition. Mr Alexis Tsipras, leader of the Coalition of the Radical Left, will now assume responsibility for heading the negotiations. They will not be easy. On one hand, resistance to the EU/IMF deal isn't concentrated into a constellation of natural allies. On the other hand, the Greek state is essentially bankrupt. Mr Tsipras may find himself needing a long spoon very soon.

It's not obvious to me how Mr Tsipras could deliver on his basic promises and still keep Greece in the common currency. With the national unity government gone, the prospect of Greece's exit from the eurozone has thus become acute. But we'll only know more once we see where the negotiations actually go. (Of course, if the negotiations go nowhere, then Greece might be headed for a caretaker government, and ultimately for new elections.)

In France, Mr Hollande has defeated Mr Sarkozy by 51,6 per cent to about 48,4 per cent, neatly ending the Socialists' long, dark exile from the Palais de l'Élysée. A few days before the second round Mrs Merkel decided to push the limits of tact, issuing a reminder that Berlin will not tolerate a re-opening of the fiscal compact. This, of course, goes against Mr Hollande's promise to do just that.

There's a potential storm brewing here, although its true strength will depend not only on what Mr Hollande actually wants to do independent of his promises, but also on what he can do. Many of his constraits will be economic. A few will be overtly political. He takes over the job in May, but he'll immediately be confronted with parliamentary elections in June. It depends on the Socialists' showing in those elections whether Mr Hollande gets a premier of his liking, or whether he'll be forced to settle into a round of la cohabitation. I'd fully expect the Socialists to win a majority, but until they do, the Hollande presidency is a bit of a work in progress.

It was a dramatic Sunday. In Greece the Socialists have been gutted, whereas in France they have prevailed. I dare say the former development worries Berlin even more than the latter one. Let's take Greece first.

Yesterday's election for the 300-seat Greek parliament left New Democracy as the largest single party bloc, with 108 seats and about 19 per cent of the vote. Seat-wise this is actually better than what they managed in 2009, although you have to remember that there's a significant winner's bonus included in the seat count. Mr Samaras playing second fiddle through two years of austerity and about a year of national unity government seems to have essentially made him heir apparent for the toughest job in the country. But the Socialists, the senior partner in the national unity coalition, have been routed. To put this in perspective, PASOK started in 2009 with 160 seats and 44 per cent of the catch. Since then their parliamentary position has slowly eroded, seat by seat, compromise by compromise, and now they've been returned to parliament with only 41 seats and a disappointing 13,2 per cent. They still have a great deal of power as the third largest parliamentary group, and I'm sure they'll play a role in the coalition negotiations, but they no longer rule the roost. And the PASOK-ND coalition can no longer continue on its own. A new modus vivendi must be sought among some combination of willing party leaders.

The biggest winner of all is Mr Alexis Tsipras's Coalition of the Radical Left, which at an impressive 16,8 per cent has captured 52 seats, and become the second-largest parliamentary group. They are fiercely critical of the government's austerity programmes. If Mr Samaras constructs a coalition without them, they will be the main opposition party. But if they get into power, they'll have to find a way to deal with Berlin and, more generally, Team Germany. (Austria, the Netherlands, &c.) My current understanding of Mr Tsipras is that he wants both a Greek default and for his country to remain in the eurozone. Even if he could get both, I have no idea how that jives with his anti-austerity position.

Meanwhile, the Communists only managed to raise their share of the vote from 7,5 to 8,5 per cent, although that still means they went from 21 to 25 seats. The Democratic Left under Mr Fotis Kouvelis got 19 seats. On the other side of the aisle, the Independent Greeks, led by former New Democracy politician Mr Panos Kammenos, got 33 seats. Then there's the Golden Dawn, which -- how should I put this? -- is the party of choice for those extremely short-haired people who, whenever near their flag, like to extend their arms in the straight and forwards position, and who feel glorious national regeneration is a matter of getting rid of foreigners. The Golden Dawn has entered parliament with 21 seats and about seven per cent of the popular vote, making international headlines in the process.

We are living in interesting times.